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preted the section as simply denoting 
that the Treaty related back to crimes 
which occurred before the Treaty was 
ratified. Id. 
Next the Court determined that sec-
tion 9 of the Treaty "provide[d] a 
mechanism [for extradition] which 
would not otherwise exist," but did not 
represent the only mechanism for gain-
ing custody. Id. at 2193-94. Article 9 
provided that afterreceiving an official 
request for extradition, a nation could 
either extradite the requested person or 
prosecute the person on its own. Id. at 
2194. Thus, Alvarez contended, Ar-
ticle 9 specified the only manner in 
which a nation could gain custody over 
an individual on foreign soil. He as-
serted that the restrictions and proce-
dures established by the Treaty be-
came superfluous if either nation was 
allowed to circumvent the Treaty 
through forcible abductions. Id. The 
Court bolstered its position, however, 
by noting that Mexico had actual no-
tice of the Ker doctrine and the 
doctrine's applicability to the Treaty. 
Id. 
Finally, the Court rQled that the 
general international law's prohibition 
of forcible abductions did not have 
effect under the Treaty, nor required 
that a similar prohibition be implied 
into the Treaty. Id. at 2194. Alvarez 
recognized that under the Treaty, the 
rights of the abducted individual were 
a derivative of the rights of the alleg-
edly aggrieved nation. As such, once 
that nation protested the abduction, the 
nation's rights under the Treaty were 
traDsformed into the individual's rights 
under the international law. Alvarez 
concluded that because both the ab-
duction violated his individual rights 
and Mexico filed a protest, the Treaty 
must be enforced on his behalf to bar 
the in personam jurisdiction of the 
United States District Court. Id. at 
2195. The Court rejected this theory 
fortwo reasons. First, the Court opined 
that such rigid enforcement produced 
unjust results if one nation acted offen-
sively toward the other. Id. Second, 
the Court pronounced that only the law 
between nations specifically applied to 
extradition treaties should be consid-
ered, not the full body of the general 
international law. Id. 
A lengthy dissent written by Justice 
Stevens and joined by Justices 
Blackmun and O'Connor condemned 
the majority ruling fortuming the terms 
of the Treaty into little more than ver-
biage. The dissent accused the Court's 
entire opinion ofbeing critically flawed 
because it failed to differentiate be-
tween private conduct and governmen-
tal action. Id at 2203. The dissent 
concluded that the abduction was ex-
pressly sanctioned by the Executive 
Branch and was therefore constituted a 
flagrant breach of the Treaty. Id. 
Thus, the majority ofthe Supreme 
Court, in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, held 
that the U.S. government may solicit 
the forcible abduction of a foreign na-
tional in order to obtain jurisdiction 
over that person. In so doing, the Court 
established the rule that the existence 
of an extradition treaty between the 
nations is consequential only if the 
treaty is invoked. This decision may 
seriously affect the United States's fu-
ture efforts to initiate joint actions with 
foreign nations who are already leery 
of the United States. After this case 
was decided, Mexico promptly ceased 
all joint actions with the DEA and also 
began the process ofre-evaluating the 
Treaty. However, it is likely that the 
Court sought to make the "right" deci-
sion under the circumstances in order 
to allow the courts to decide the inno-
cence, or guilt, of an alleged villain. 
By adopting the approach that an ex-
tradition treaty must be invoked to 
have affect, the Court eliminated treaty-
based jurisdictional challenges to in-
ternational abductions and granted the 
United States a free hand to grab sus-
pected criminals and bring them to 
trial. 
- Brett R. Wilson 
MVA v. Chamberlain: DRUNKDRIV-
ERS NEED NOT BE INFORMED 
OF ALLDISP ARITIESBETWEEN 
SANCTIONS FOR FAILING A 
CHEMICAL ALCOHOL CON-
CENTRATION TEST AND RE-
FUSING TO TAKE SUCH A TEST 
ALTOGETHER. 
In a unanimous decision interpret-
ing sections of Maryland's transporta-
tion statutes relating to drunk driving, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
MV A v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 296, 
604 A.2d 919 (1992), ruled that a po-
lice officer is not required to inform an 
intoxicated motorist of all potential 
differences in penalties between refus-
ing and failing a chemical alcohol con-
centration test. In so holding, the Court 
declined to recognize additional pro-
cedural protection for motorists who 
decline to submit to a blood alcohol 
test. 
The defendant Chamberlain was 
stopped by a police officer for speed-
ing and suspicion of driving while 
intoxicated Afterthe officerpenormed 
some field sobriety tests on Chamber-
lain, the officer placed Chamberlain 
under arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated. Then, quoting section 16-205.1 
of the Transportation Article of the 
Maryland Annotated Code, the officer 
informed Chamberlain of his rights 
pertaining to taking a chemical test to 
determine his blood alcohol level. 
The officer told Chamberlain of his 
right to refuse to submit to the test but 
warned that a refusal would result in an 
administrative suspension ofhis Mary-
land driver's license. Additionally, the 
officer stipulated that "[ s ]uspension by 
the Motor Vehicle Administration shall 
be 120 days for a first offense and one 
year for a second or subsequent of-
fense." Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 310, 
604 A.2d at 921 (quoting Md. Trans. 
Code Ann. § 16-205. 1 (b) (1987». 
Chamberlain was also told of the 
consequences of failing to take the test. 
The officer, quoting from an advice of 
rights form, warned Chamberlain that 
if he submitted to the test, and the 
results indicated an alcohol concentra-
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tion of .10 or more, an administrative 
suspension ofhis driver's license would 
result. The officer further informed 
Chamberlain that "[t )he suspension by 
the Motor Vehicle Administmtionshall 
be 45 days for a first offense and 90 
days for a second or subsequent of-
fense." Id. However, the officer did 
not tell Chamberlain that if he failed 
the test, the suspension could be modi-
fied or a restrictive license could be 
issued for work and alcohol education 
purposes. 
Because Chamberlain refused to 
take the test, his license was tempo-
rarily confiscated and he was issued a 
temporary 45 day restrictive license. 
At his administrative hearing Cham-
berlain contended that the police offi-
cer had not properly advised him of the 
consequences of refusing to take the 
test or of failing it. Chamberlain, 326 
Md at 311, 604 A.2d at 920. The 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALI") 
refused to consider Chamberlain's ar-
gument. The Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County, however, found the 
officer's advice to be inadequate and 
reversed the decision of the AU. Id. at 
312, 604 A.2d at 920. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted certio-
rari to consider the case because it 
found the matter to be of public impor-
tance. Id. 
The heart of Chamberlain's argu-
ment on appeal concerned how much 
advice the police were required to give 
a detained driver who refused to sub-
mit to a chemical alcohol concentra-
tion test. Id. at 312, 604 A.2d at 922. 
Specifically, Chamberlain focused on 
the language of section 16-205.1 (b )(2) 
of the Transportation Article which 
provides that "[t )he police officer shaH 
. . . advise the person of the admin-
istrative sanctions that shall be im-
posed for the refusal to take the test." 
Chamberlain, 326 Md at 313, 604 
A.2d at 922 (emphasis added). Tum-
ing to earlier laws pertaining to chemi-
cal alcohol tests, Chamberlain pointed 
out that the word ''penalties'' in the 
prior statute had been replaced by the 
word "sanctions" in the current statute. 
Id. Contending that the word "sanc-
tions" was broader than the word ''pen-
alties," Chamberlain asserted that the 
Legislature intended for more advice 
to be given under the current statute 
than under the former. Id. Thus, 
Chamberlain argued that in addition to 
the length of the suspension, the de-
tained driver must at least have been 
told of another possible consequence 
resulting from failing the test, but not 
from refusing it. 
In opposition, the MV A contended 
that the police need only inform the 
detained driver of the difference in the 
lengths ofthe suspensions forrefusing 
to take the test and for failing the test. 
Id. at 314, 604 A.2d at 922. Further, 
the MV A argued that possible eligibil-
ity for a restrictive license or modifica-
tion ofthe suspension was not a "sanc-
tion" as contemplated by the Legisla-
ture and thus was not a fact of which 
the driver needed to be informed Id. 
In ruling against Chamberlain, the 
court of appeals first noted that in 
determining legislative intent, statu-
tory construction mandated that the 
language of a statute be given its ordi-
nary and common meaning. Id. at314, 
604 A.2d at 923 (citing Dickerson v. 
State, 324 Md 163, 170-72,516 A.2d 
648, 651-52 (1991». The court ex-
plained that section 16-205.9(b)(1) 
explicitly detailed the consequences 
for refusal and failure to take a chemi-
cal test and further pointed out that 
nowhere in subsection (b)(I) was the 
word "sanction" ever mentioned. Be-
cause of this omission, the court rea-
soned that subsequent paragraphs in 
the subsection which used the words 
"administrative sanctions" were merely 
using a "short hand equivalent" relat-
ing implicitly back to (b)(I); thus, the 
word "sanction" had no independent 
meaning from that given to it in (b)( 1). 
Chamberlain, 326 Md at 316, 604 
A.2d at 924. The court determined that 
such an interpretation of the statutory 
language was "reasonable and consis-
tent with the purposes of the statute." 
Id. at 317, 604 A.2d at 924. 
The court also rejected Chamberlain's 
assertion that advice concerning the 
possibility for suspension might be 
incentive to take the test and was there-
fore a "sanction"underthe broad mean-
ing ofthe word Id. The court stated 
that such a possibility was not a sanc-
tion because, although the word "sanc-
tion" might in some contexts encom-
pass rewards as weIl as penalties, not 
every conceivable incentive for action 
was a reward Id. at 318, 604 A..2d 
at 924. Moreover, the court asserted 
that it was "inconceivable" that the 
Legislature intended sanctions to in-
clude advice about one's potential to 
obtain a modified license if one failed 
that chemical alcohol concentration 
test. Id. Whether a person would 
consider this possibility as an incen-
tive to take the test was questioned by 
the court. 
Furthermore, it was noted that in-
forming a person that he or she might 
get a modified license by taking the 
test was misleading. Id. at 319, 604 
A.2d at 925. Although a license could 
potentiaIly be modified, an individual 
would have to meet statutory prerequi-
sites in order to become eligible. Be-
cause the arresting officer would have 
no way of knowing whether or not a 
detained driver would meet the prereq-
uisites, the court asserted that giving 
notification might falsely persuade the 
motorist to take the test. 
Finally, the court reviewed deci-
sions of other jurisdictions involving 
interpretation of drunk driving stat-
utes. The court noted that the consen-
sus of other states was that, although a 
driver was to be given the option of 
whether to take a chemical test, the 
driver need not be told of every pos-
sible consequence of each option. Id. 
at 320, .604 A.2d at 926. Aligning itself 
with the decisions of other states, the 
court of appeals held that Chamberlain 
had been sufficiently advised of the 
consequences ofboth refusing and fail-
ing a chemical test for alcohol. Id. at 
323, 604 A.2d at 926. Thus, 
Chamberlain's license suspension was 
affirmed. 
MV A. v. Chamberlain affirms the 
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Legislature's intent that a driver need 
not be told o fall possible consequences 
between refusing and failing a chemi-
cal test for alcohol. In addition, by 
fmding that the word "sanctions" does 
not encompass mere possibilities, the 
court has refused to recognize addi-
tional procedural safeguards for per-
sons who decline to take chemical al-
cohol concentration tests. By deciding 
that an officer is not required to advise 
a driver of potential eligibility for 
modification of suspension or restric-
tive license if a driver takes the chemi-
cal alcohol test, the court has implied 
that a person who refuses to take the 
test must be prepared to face the conse-
quences. 
- Ellen Marth 
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul: CITY OR-
DINANCE BANNING CROSS 
BURNINGS AND OTHER SYM-
BOLS OF HATE SPEECH VIO-
LA TES THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT. 
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. 
Ct. 2538 (1992), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a city ordi-
nance banning cross burnings and other 
hate crimes violated the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 
because it discriminated on the basis of 
speech content and was not reasonably 
necessary to achieve the compelling 
interest of protecting groups that have 
historically been the victims of dis-
crimination. While the Court unani-
mously agreed that the law was fa-
cially invalid, it was divided over the 
proper analysis of the ordinance under 
the First Amendment. The Court's 
decision resulted in a clash of interpre-
tations, with a four member concur-
rence charging the majority with aban-
doning long established First Amend-
ment principles. 
In 1990, the petitioner, a white teen-
ager, burned a cross on the front lawn 
of a black family that had recently 
moved into the city ofSt. Paul, Minne-
sota. The petitioner was charged with 
violating a local hate crime law that 
prohibited the display of a symbol 
which aroused anger, alann, or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender. The 
ordinance specifically cited cross burn-
ing and swastika displays as acts pun-
ishable under its mandate. 
The trial court dismissed the charges 
on the grounds that the law was sub-
stantially overbroad and impermissi-
bly content-based. The Supreme Court 
of Minnesota rejected the overbreadth 
claim and upheld the ordinance be-
cause the statute limited its reach to 
"fighting words" and was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. The petitioner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, arguing that it infringed upon his 
First Amendment right to free speech. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to consider whether the ordinance dis-
criminated impermissibly on the basis 
of content, and, if so, whether such 
discrimination was reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the state's compelling 
interest in protecting those who have 
historically been the targets of dis-
crimination. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
began his analysis by acknowledging 
that limited categories of speech - such 
as obscenity, defamation and fighting 
words - had been proscribed on the 
basis of content because their low so-
cial value was outweighed by a higher 
social interest. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 
2543 (citing Chap/inskyv. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942». In 
this case, however, the majority re-
jected the view that "fighting words," 
defined as insults which are likely to 
provoke the listener to react violently, 
were entirely without constitutional 
protection. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. 
The Court determined that the govern-
ment could proscribe "fighting words" 
in general because of the activity they 
provoked, but it could not proscribe 
specific sub-categories of fighting 
words because of the ideas they ex-
pressed orthe classes they targeted. Id. 
at 2544. Thus, the majority found that 
the St. Paul ordinance was content 
discriminatory because it imposed spe-
cial prohibitions on those who ex-
pressed views on the disfavored sub-
jects of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender, while at the same time permit-
ting equally abusive messages which 
did not address those topics. R.A. V., 
112 S. Ct. at 2547. In addition, the 
Court reasoned that because there were 
content-neutral alternatives available, 
such as prosecuting the conduct under 
an arson statute, the city's compelling 
interest in protecting minority groups 
from victimization did not justify the 
law's discrimination. Id at 2550. 
The Court next outlined the two 
exceptions to content-based discrimi-
nation. The flI'st exception occurs when 
the purpose of the distinction is con-
tent-neutral. Id. at 2545. A$ an illus-
tration, the Court noted that a state 
could prohibit obscenity generally, but 
it could not prohibit obscenity that 
only included offensive political mes-
sages.ld at2546. Similarly, the Court 
noted that burning a flag in violation of 
an arson statute was punishable, but it 
had been held content-discriminatory 
to punish flag burning in violation of a 
law against dishonoring the flag. Id. at 
2544 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989». "Fighting 
words," according to the Court, were 
unprotected because ''their content 
embodie[d] an intolerable mode of 
expression." R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 
2549. Justice Scalia's analysis sug-
gested that cross burning was not "es-
pecially offensive" as it did not com-
municate ideas in a ''threatening (as 
opposed to a merely obnoxious) man-
ner." Id. 
The Court then addressed the sec-
ond exception which would permit 
content-based discrimination: where 
the regulation was aimed at the sec-
ondary effects of the speech without 
reference to the content of the speech. 
Id. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theaters 
Inc.,475U.S.41,48 (1986». TheCity 
ofSt. Paul cited this second exception 
as the basis forthe discrimination in its 
ordinance, arguing that the St. Paul 
ordinance was not intended to stifle 
freedom of expression, but rather was 
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